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This Article is, in essence, a strident expression of indignation about
what a majority of tax scholars and, indeed, legislators consider a glaring
yet persistent inequity in the tax code. In short, sometimes extraordinarily
well-paid fund managers receive compensation taxed at capital gains rates.
All other, usually very much lower-compensated, service providers are
taxed at ordinary rates. The result is clearly regressive and yet, as of late,
even some respected and knowledgeable scholars-though still in the
minority-have unabashedly set forth sophisticated-sounding justifications.
Objections based on unfairness, real, or even merely perceived, are difficult
to express without a tone of indignation, particularly when the objecting
party feels the inequity personally. Thus, the Article occasionally uses
rhetoric that is specifically intended to indict as well as to disprove. One
simply cannot argue in support of a patently offensive outcome without
expecting a strident response, even if the responder strains to express that
response with the same degree of dispassionate sophistry utilized by
proponents of the inequity. Perhaps apologies in advance are in order. In
any event, Section II provides a summary of the indignation and a roadmap
to the rest of the Article.
1I. A SUMMARY OF INDIGNENT OBJECTIONS
Section II initiates an overdue critical examination of the historical
status quo, as well as a preview of the assertions contained in Sections III
through V. It should be noted, parenthetically, that similar critical
examinations are occurring not only in the United States but in other
Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. J.D., University of Florida 1983,
LLM (Tax) University of Florida 1994.
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countries as well. The Dutch, 1 German,2 and U.K. governments,3 for
example, have recently undertaken a critical examination of how the
"carried interest" is taxed, no doubt in part due to popular recognition of the
inequity described in this Article. In particular, this Section notes that the
initial decision to afford what can only be described as a tax advantage,
relative to the taxes imposed on other service providers, was motivated by
expediency. There is evidence, in fact, that fund managers were aware that
their tax advantage might legitimately be viewed as unfair. Historically,
fund managers' strategy in response to questions regarding why their
compensation is currently taxed at capital gains rates was to remain silent
and hope no one noticed.4  This strategy prevailed, when the pooled
investment fund model was in its infancy. At the time there were no
arguments offered in support of taxing what amounts to transfers for
services as though they were in exchange for capital. There was only
silence and unrequited interview requests. 5 The period of "irrational
exuberance," 6 however, has now exposed to light what fund managers had
1 See BORIS EMMERIG & RODERIK BOUWMAN, CHANGES IN DUTCH TAXATION OF CARRIED
INTERESTS SCHEMES (July 29, 2008), http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/4a35b9lf-
c3eb-42d9-9813-2450625812d2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ac4369d3-a315-42e7-
a39a-3192a8536300/Change%20in%20Dutch%20taxation%20o/o20carried%20interest%20
schemes.pdf (regarding proposed legislation to tax carried interest payments at fifty-two
percent).
2 Uwe Baerenz, Amos Veith & Ronald Buge, How Carried Interest Is Taxed in Germany,
25 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 30 (Supp. 2006), available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/1984651
/How-carried-interest-is-taxed-in-Germany.html (describing the German "Carried Interest
Act" subjecting carried interest payments to ordinary taxation rather than capital gains
taxation).
3 See SELECT COMMITTEE ON TREASURY, TENTH REPORT, 2006-7, H.C.567-I, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2006O7/cmselect/cmtreasy/567/56709.htm
(questioning whether U.K. capital gains taxation of carried interest result in inequity and
distortion); see also Robert Peston, Tax and Private Equity, BBC NEWS: PESTON'S PICKS,
June 15, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2007/06/taxand
_private-equity.html (describing "the irresistible pressure to reform this system [i.e. capital
gains taxation of the carried interest] in some way .... ).
4 See Peter Landau, The Hedge Funds: Wall Street's New Way to Make Money, N.Y.
MAG., Oct. 21, 1968, at 20, 22 (discussing hedge fund managers' efforts to avoid publicity
for fear that the "the Internal Revenue Service could change the provision in the tax laws that
makes a hedge fund manager's 20 per cent [sic] fee taxable at capital gains rates.").
5 Id.
6 "Irrational exuberance" is a phrase famously uttered by former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan at a 1996 lecture sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research. Alan Greenspan, Fed. Reserve Chairman, The Challenge of
Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Address at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer
Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996)
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm. He
used the phrase with respect to a discussion of the illogical increase in asset values, which
explains in part the increased flow of capital towards hedge, venture, and private equity
funds that are the subject of this Article. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The Rational
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preferred remained hidden in the dark.7  Predictably and brazenly, those
Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-Up, 57 TAx L. REv. 137 (2003) (describing
"irrational exuberance" as the sort of 'we can't lose ethos' that caused an over investment in
hedge funds); Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and
Democracy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 17, 19-21 (2008) (describing the abundant capital
investments in hedge funds and private equity funds as "another case of irrational
exuberance").
7 The exacting scrutiny paid to hedge fund and private equity fund manager
compensation is largely a function of the huge flows of capital into such funds, a percentage
of which were paid out as compensation to those fund managers. In 2007, for example, "the
fifty highest-paid hedge fund managers.., earned a total of $29 billion." Jacoby, supra note
6, at 23. When Professor Victor Fleischer published his now famous article exposing the
fact that many fund managers earned over $100 million taxed at capital gains rates (generally
fifteen percent), the scrutiny became more intense in the media, in Congress, and even as
part of the 2008 Presidential campaign. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing
Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2008). Although
Professor Fleischer's article appeared in the Spring 2008 issue of the New York University
Law Review, it was first published online in March 2006 in draft form at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=892440. Soon thereafter, media outlets
around the world began scrutinizing the taxing of fund manager compensation. See, e.g.,
Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private-Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, Bus.,
at 4; Taxing Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007, at Al:
The deeper question in all this is whether capital gains-which are currently taxed
at less than half the top rate of ordinary income-should continue to be so lavishly
advantaged. The answer there is no. Today's preferential rate for capital gains is
excessive, with no mechanism in the tax code to ensure that it is not overused.
Excessively favoring one form of income over another encourages wasteful
gamesmanship, creates inequity and crowds out other ways to foster risk-taking.
Tackling the too-easy tax terms for private equity is a good way for Congress to
begin addressing that bigger issue.
See also A Private Equity Primer: Just Why is Their Tax So Low?, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(UK), June 21, 2007, at 4; John Beveridge, Taxing Times Ahead for the Hedgers, HERALD
SUN (Austl.), June 21, 2007, at 69; Peter Lattman, Academic Gets His Close-Up In Private
Equity Tax Fracas, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007. Media reports, in turn, led to Congressional
scrutiny. See Carried Interest Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 1l0th Cong.
(2007), available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing07l07.htm; Carried Interest
Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing073107.htm (hereinafter Carried Interest I);
Carried Interest Part III: Pension Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing090607.htn; Fair and
Equitable Tax Policy for America's Working Families: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov
/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=584 (hereinafter Tax Policy for America's
Working Families). I testified at Carried Interest II and Tax Policy for America's Working
Families. See Carried Interest II, supra, (statement of Darryll K. Jones) available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/073 107testdj.pdf; Tax Policy for
America's Working Families, supra, (statement of Darryll K. Jones) available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.aspformmode-view&id=6431. During the most
recent presidential campaign, President Obama's tax plan included a provision to reform the
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who all along had benefitted in comfortable obscurity from the capital gain
characterization, and despite the open acknowledgment that carry payments
are wealth transfers in exchange for services, now argue that carried interest
payments are instead returns on capital and therefore have all along been
properly taxed as capital gain.
8
If nothing else, the unexpected outing suggests the heretofore
unacknowledged presence and influence of situational tax ethics. One
might expect that those who now so argue (usually in sophisticated or semi-
sophisticated economic terms), deny awareness of the historical facts
suggesting that they knew better all along, or indeed, that they are at all
influenced by the prospect that their own financial situation might suffer. It
is also admittedly against academic convention that purists, those who insist
on ordinary income taxation of the carried interest, might harbor suspicions
that academic discourse is skewed by personal bias or interest. 9 Taxation,
though, is as much an art as it is a science. It is therefore legitimate to
acknowledge self interest and politics1° as much as logic and tax
taxation of profit interests. See OBAMA'08, BARACK OBAMA'S COMPREHENSIVE TAX PLAN
(2008), available at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/taxes/Factsheet Tax Plan
_FINAL.pdf (promising to "[cilos[e] other loopholes: including taxing [profit] interest as
ordinary income" (emphasis in original)). Eventually, the President's proposed 2010 budget
included a provision to tax payments received with respect to carried interests as ordinary
income. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING
AMERICA'S PROMISE 122 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb
/assets/fy20lOnewera/ANewEra-of Responsibility2.pdf.
8 See e.g., David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94
VA. L. REV. 715 (2008). Professor Weisbach's article, which was also read into the record of
Carried Interest II, was funded by the Private Equity Council. See Carried Interest II, supra
note 7 (testimony of Bruce Rosenblum, Chairman of the Board, Private Equity Council),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/073107testbr.pdf.
9 Scholarly tax discourse only rarely acknowledges personal bias or interest as a
determinate or influencing factor of tax rules; more often, tax scholars insist on the "logic"
or "science" of their preferences. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the
Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465
(1987) (arguing, in essence, that objections to progressive tax rates are influenced by a
masculine world view); Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the
Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 751 (1996) (setting forth many examples in the
tax code, the articulation of which is influenced by those with the most to gain from the
provisions based on race). Professor Weisbach's article, for example, insists that there is no
theoretical basis for capital gain taxation and hence no logic against which capital gain
taxation of carried interests conflicts. David A. Weisbach, supra note 8, at 742-43. It is not
my purpose in this Article to indict the personal motives of those who argue for the status
quo. Instead, I seek only to insist that proponents are not entirely disinterested in the
outcome. Professor Weisbach's article is the easiest example because it was "funded" by
private equity fund managers whose taxes would increase by a change in the law.
10 Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform That Did Not Happen,
40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 197, 227 (2009). A discussion on the influence of the political process
on the efforts to reform the taxation of carried interests is presented in Darryll K. Jones, The
Taxation of Profit Interests and the Reverse Mancur Olson Phenomenon, 36 CAP. U. L. REv.
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fundamentals. That is why it should surprise no one that what is often
labeled tax policy or logic is hardly either.
The overarching assertion made in this Article-that arguments in
support of the status quo cannot be explained by logic, reason, or
deduction-is intended to allow readers to draw the conclusion implicit in
the Article's title. Indeed, so much has been written on the topic that it is
unnecessary to recount the events culminating in the present state of affairs
to any great extent.IX History, as noted above, is not entirely irrelevant.
Thus, Section III will briefly outline the expedient decision regarding the
853 (2009). Professor Abrams states:
There are, it seems, three possible explanations for the failure of carried interest
reform to have succeeded. First, it could be that private equity outfoxed reform-
minded academics. Professor Fleischer framed the carried interest issue largely in
class-warfare terms, with private equity and hedge fund managers as the bad guys.
Somehow, by the time legislative reform was proposed, the change captured real
estate partnerships as well. But the arguments in favor of reform fit less
comfortably on such a broad class of partners, many of whom are not wealthy and
almost all of whom vote. Had the legislation targeted only private equity funds
and hedge funds, it is hard to see how it could have failed.
A second explanation is that Congress did not want it to succeed in the first place.
As Professor Fred McChesney first recognized more than twenty years ago,
legislators who seek to maximize the value of their legislative activity for
themselves can threaten insular groups with disadvantageous reform and then
collect economic rents in exchange for not passing the legislation.
Abrams, supra, at 227.
1 The seminal article on the taxation of carried interests (before the coining of the phrase
"carried interest") is: Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service
Partners, 48 TAX L. REV. 69 (1992). Similar discussion on the issue prior to the outing of
carried interests can be found in other sources. See Martin B. Cowan, Receipt of an Interest
in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services: The Diamond Case, 27 TAX L. REV 161
(1972); Laura E. Cunningham, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services, 47 TAX
L. REV. 247, 252 (1992); Leo L. Schrnolka, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for
Services: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAx L. REV. 287 (1992). More recent
scholarships provoked by Professor Fleischer's article include: Howard E. Abrams, Taxation
of Carried Interests, 116 TAX NOTES 183 (2007); Thomas J. Brennan & Karl S. Okamoto,
Measuring the Tax Subsidy in Private Equity and Hedge Fund Compensation, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 27 (2008); Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests:
Estimating The Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 115 (2008); Sarah Pendergraft, From Human Capital to Capital Gains: The
Puzzle of Profits Interests, 27 VA. TAX REV. 709 (2008); Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax
Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares. What Is It? Why Is
It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (2008); Michael L. Schler, Taxing Partnership Profits as
Compensation Income, 119 TAX NOTES 829 (2008); Weisbach, supra note 8; Note, Taxing
Private Equity Carried Interest Using an Incentive Stock Option Analogy, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 846 (2008).
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present law tax consequences applicable to the grant of an equity interest
for services. 12 The relevant part of the sequential history is contained in the
very apparent and continuing consensus that a service partner's efforts to
characterize compensation for services as capital gain was so presumptively
illicit that scarcely a word was said in that partner's defense. After having
confirmed the illicit nature of those efforts, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) decided as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, not logic, reason, or
deduction, that it was not cost efficient to enforce the conclusion. 13 The
first purpose of tax law, of course, is to raise revenue for public goods and
services. 14  Insisting on the purist approach, as this Article does, was
considered inefficient because the revenues derived from taxing service
providers upon the grant of an equity interest was estimated as insignificant
at best. 15 Section III explains that scholars resurrected the issue when
circumstances changed such that the revenue to be derived from a purist's
approach was much more significant. 16 Thus, when it became notoriously
12 Formally, the history is embodied in Campbell v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir.
1991); Diamond v. Comm'r, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974); Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B.
191; Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
B "Prosecutorial discretion" is used because the substantive decision to tax the yield from
profit interests as whatever characterization prevailed at the partnership level was made by
statements of procedure. See Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191; Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-
2 C.B. 343.
14 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, FINAL REPORT xiii (Nov.
1, 2005), available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/TaxReformExSumm.pdf
("We have lost sight of the fact that the fundamental purpose of our tax system is to raise
revenues to fund government.").
15 See Knoll, supra note 11, at 128-29:
If the tax rates, both for ordinary income and capital gain, are the same for the
general partner and for all of the limited partners, then there is neither a net benefit
nor a net loss from the current tax treatment of carried interests. In such
circumstances, reforming the taxation of carried interests-by treating receipt as
current ordinary income and payment as current ordinary deduction-will not
increase net tax collections. The additional tax collected from the general partner
will offset the reduced tax collections from limited partners.
16 Id. at 161 (estimating an increase in revenues from the reformation of carried interest
taxation at amounts ranging from two billion dollars to three billion dollars per year). The
Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the changed character of carried interest
payments would yield $25.624 billion over the period from 2008 to 2017. J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE CHAIRMAN'S AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE
OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 3996 ( 2007) (a bill to tax carried interest payments as ordinary
income), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-105-07.pdf. The primary reason for the
change from no net revenue to roughly two to three billion dollars per year is that many of
the investors in pooled funds are tax exempt and thus would not claim a deduction to offset
salary payments in any event. See id. at 129. The President's 2010 budget proposal asserts
that the change would generate approximately twenty four billion dollars between the years
Sophistry and the Carried Interest
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apparent that managers of private equity funds and hedge funds earned huge
amounts while paying lower taxes than lower paid service providers,
situational ethics argued instead in favor of taxing recipients logically and
in the most apparently equitable fashion. Section IV acknowledges that
though market conditions have once again dictated that the revenues
derived from adherence to purity may be paltry as a relative matter at the
moment,17 there has always been intrinsic value in the purist approach.
Inevitably, sophistry and situational ethics induce mischief because the
former is eventually exposed as such, usually by a clever tax planner who
exploits the sophistry for personal gain, while the latter requires very
frequent adjustment as tax abuses derived from the deviation from logic or
economics evolve. The fundamental thread that should answer tax
questions without the need for convoluted statutory explanation becomes
frayed each time sophistry and situational ethics are allowed to trump
fundamental principles. Reliance on momentary expediency costs more
than it saves; what is characterized as an expedient exception eventually
becomes normative if only by repeated application. More importantly,
sophistry and situational ethics serve as indictments beyond the limited
context to which they seem momentarily pragmatic. If, for example, the
grant of an equity interest is correctly taxed as capital gain, what then
should be said about the historical justifications for taxing wealthier
capitalists more favorably than poorer laborers? In other words, the
application of capital gain rates to the carry inexorably suggests that there is
no logical justification for the application of lower tax rates to the return on
previously taxed invested capital.' 8
Section IV confronts two of the more inventive arguments in favor of
the status quo. The "blended labor/capital" argument' 9 is an implicit
2010 and 2019. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 7.
17 See Top Hedge Fund Manager Reaped $3.7 Billion in 2007, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 2008,
at C6:
Average compensation for the top 25 fund managers was $892 million in 2007, up
68 percent from the previous year. The minimum compensation included in the
ranking was $210 million, Alpha said. Those salaries may be a high-water mark
for the $1.9 trillion industry, which had its worst start in nearly two decades this
year. Hedge funds lost 2.8 percent in the first three months after gaining 10
percent in 2007, according to Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc.
The President's budget projects no revenue gain for the years 2009 and 2010. OFFICE OF
MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 7.
18 See Taxing Private Equity, supra note 11; see also Jones, supra note 10, at 878
(predicting that investors who enjoy capital gain treatment recognize that the taxation of
carried interests as capital gain jeopardizes their own preferential treatment and will join
those who oppose the status quo if only to maintain their own preference).
19 This argument has most recently been set forth in Philip Postlewaite, Fifteen and
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admission that the yield from human capital ought to be taxed at a certain
rate, regardless of the means of payment or the legal status of the service
provider. The only real objection relates to the alleged complexities that
would arise if the grant of, or yield from, a carried interest was accurately
taxed. The "entrepreneurial risk" argument is deficient for several reasons,
including the initial fact that the fixed portion of fund manager
compensation eliminates any risk of loss. 20 That argument too, though, is
situational. Were it the only assertion, we would then conclude that
eliminating the "two" from the "two and twenty" justifies differential
taxation of fund managers. Hence, the more fundamental and logical
response to the entrepreneurial risk argument is that the parties ought to be
left to freely allocate the risks as they see fit and that preferential taxation is
justifiable only to the extent the market does not adequately produce a
needed commodity because the risk to labor or capital is too high. 21 If it
were proven that fund managers are so risk averse that the market cannot
account for that aversion, preferential tax treatment of those scarce labor
suppliers would be justified. That case has not and likely cannot be made.
Throughout, the Article sets aside arguments based solely on
semantics. Thus, that a service provider may very well be referred to as
"partner" under state and even federal law is of no logical consequence to
the determination of whether the service provider ought to be taxed more
favorably than a service provider who is not so labeled by any definition.22
Thirty-Five-Class Warfare in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code: The Taxation of
Human Capital Upon the Receipt of a Proprietary Interest in a Business Enterprise, 28 VA.
TAX REv. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1297301. Professor Weisbach makes a similar contention. See Weisbach, supra note 8.
20 Postlewaite, supra note 19. Hedge fund and private equity fund managers are typically
compensated via a formula commonly referred to as "two and twenty." Fleischer, supra note
7, at 9-11 (stating that the two percent fixed fee pays the fund manager's salary).
21 See Brennan & Okamoto, supra note 11 (applying subsidy theory to the taxation of the
carried interest and concluding that the status quo ante unnecessarily subsidizes hedge and
private equity fund managers).
22 The Revised Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership (necessarily composed of
"partners") as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997). For a far-reaching discussion of the label and
consequences of the term "partner," see Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture, and The Lore of
Partnership: Of Entrepreneurs, Accountability, and the Evolving Status of Partners, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 793 (2005). In tax jurisprudence, one of the most important cases
considering the meaning of partnership and partners is Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733
(1949). In that case, the Court stated that the existence of a partnership depends on whether
the parties "really and truly intended to join together for the purpose of carrying on business
and sharing the profits or losses or both." Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 741. Although
recognized experts suggest that the enactment of I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) significantly broadens
the definition of "partner" for tax purposes, the issue is of no consequence in this article. See
William S. McKee, William F. Nelson & Robert L. Whitmire, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS, 3.02[1] -3.02[5] (1997). I readily concede for purposes of
this Article that the recipient of a profit interest may legitimately be labeled a "partner"
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The label "partner" adds nothing to the intellectual challenge that the status
quo proponent(s) necessarily face. Likewise, the fact that the detailed rules
spawned by Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 704(b? preclude a nominal
increase in a service partner's capital account, reflective of her
contributed human capital, is just as irrelevant and inconsequential to the
question of the proper rate of tax that should be applied to the service
provider's newly acquired wealth. Section IV pauses on this point to note
that the administrative dictate that service partners receive no credit to their
capital account in return for services-services that are to be compensated
via a share of future profits-is not entirely a matter of expediency,
sophistry, or even situational ethics. Here, there is at least a fundamental
populist reason for an accounting conclusion reflecting that the service
provider has not yet incurred a tax liability. Thus, the Article does not take
issue with the fact that a service provider who agrees to postpone her ability
to consume (i.e., eat or spend presently) has no present tax liability. The
Article's contention is that the value of an equity interest attributable to the
expenditure of human capital ought to be taxed at a certain constant rate,
whether that human capital is expended by an "employee" or a "partner."
Section V, the conclusion, states the positive case by reiterating the
initially unquestioned instinct that like taxpayers should be taxed alike.
Thus, Section V reiterates a principle-horizontal equity-that has
animated tax law since society first determined that every person who
benefits from the provision of public goods and services ought to contribute
to that provision and that a just society requires an equitable distribution of
wealth . To the extent society determines that forced extractions are the
price of civilization, it must make those extractions in a just manner. To
extract more or less from equally benefiting persons is to extract unjustly.
Ironically, the simplicity of the argument emboldens proponents. Implicit
in their responses is that those who insist upon a simple and unquestioned
rule of horizontal equity do not understand the alleged complexities of the
under state or federal law. See also Rev. Proc. 2001-43 2001-2 C.B. 191 (requiring that a
recipient of a profit interest be treated as a "partner" for federal tax purposes as a condition
for receiving the dispensation articulated in the revenue procedure).
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(a) (2008) (stating that a partner's capital account may
be increased solely for contributions of cash, property, or allocated gains).
24 See, e.g., David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principal of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 43,43-44 (2006):
The principle of horizontal equity demands that similarly situated individuals face
similar tax burdens. It is universally accepted as one of the more significant
criteria of a "good tax." It is relied upon in discussions of the tax base, the tax
unit, the reporting period, and more. Violation of horizontal equity, while not
necessarily fatal, is nevertheless considered a serious flaw in any proposed tax
arrangement.
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world that somehow requires deviation from that golden rule. Section V
neither summarizes nor restates the task undertaken in the preceding parts.
It is, rather, a plea of sorts. It leaves to the reader the intellectual freedom
to conscientiously evaluate the merits of taxing a service provider labeled as
a "partner" preferentially vis-A-vis a service provider labeled an
"employee." The conclusion is intentionally lacking in sophisticated
economic analysis, relying instead on a simple, straightforward assumption
with which the reader either agrees or disagrees.
III. AN EXPEDIENT STATUS QUO
The development of the law pertaining to the taxation of the carry is,
in a word, a story of expediency. This is an instructive point because
proponents explicitly or implicitly reject the notion that capital gains
taxation of carried interest arose by mistake rather than by intelligent
design.2 5 To admit the former would place the intellectual burden where it
ought to be. To assert the latter gives the status quo an initial sense of
legitimacy-the assertion is essentially a rhetorical tool that responds to and
serves to discount the value placed on visceral emotion that horizontal
equity has a preeminent place in tax jurisprudence.26 Thus, it is a
disagreeable notion that taxing one service provided preferentially to
another could be justifiable. Expediency in tax jurisprudence is not without
value, but because it is situational, it cannot replace enduring values in a
body of law that is itself ultimately an expression of social values rather
than the objective conclusion of economic science.27
25 See, e.g., Postlewaite, supra note 19 (manuscript at 30):
A fundamental misconception about the current tax law is that the investment of
human capital under the Code generates ordinary income. As illustrated, much of
the return on compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise is taxed
preferentially. In fact, a profits interest in a partnership frequently generates
ordinary income while an equity interests in a corporation, if profitable, invariably
results in preferential capital gain. Thus, the assertion that the treatment of profits
interest is inconsistent with other compensatory transfers of equity interests is
mistaken,
26 Even proponents of the status quo accept the legitimacy of horizontal equity. They
then either attempt to prove that the status quo meets the horizontal equity criteria, see id.,
or that the concept of horizontal equity is a "baseless concept" and therefore of no use. See
Weisbach, supra note 8, at 740.
27 Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Reform: The 1980's Perspective, 46 TAX L. REV. 489, 491
(1991). The author states:
Many of the problems with most contemporary analysis of the federal income tax
can be traced to this untenable assumption that those policies conveniently lumped
together under the rubric of tax reform are something other than the expression of
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Generically, the grant of a carried interest is the promise to pay an
uncertain amount in exchange for services. Even 2proponents admit this
much. The right is neither funded nor secured. 2  Hence, even after
prevailing in Diamond v. Commissioner,29 the government nevertheless
determined for administrative reasons that receipt of a right to receive
indefinite wealth in exchange for services should not cause an immediate
tax liability.30  It is a mistake, though, to characterize that decision as one
a particular political perspective, one that has its own agenda, favoring certain
interests over others, and with its own constituency that derives considerable
political satisfaction and benefits from success in the political arena. Tax
reformism is political by nature precisely because any change (whether designated
as reform or otherwise) to existing political institutions and extant legal structures
has distinct political implications. The adoption of any significant change to the
tax law constitutes a political act. Indeed, the very decision to adopt an income tax
is a political decision of the highest order.
Id.
28 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005) (defining "property" to "include[]
real and personal property other than either money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to
pay money or property in the future.").
29 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974). The facts of Diamond are easily stated and understood:
Sol Diamond agreed to arrange a $1.1 million loan for Phil Kargman's purchase of
a building. In exchange, Kargman agreed that Diamond would receive 60% of the
profits from their joint operation of the building. The joint venture agreement
stated that Kargman would provide all the cash needed beyond the loan amount for
the purchase of the building, and that proceeds of any sale of the building would be
distributed to Kargman to the extent of his cash contribution. Any sale proceeds
beyond Kargman's repayment right (i.e., any profit) would be divided equally.
Kargman eventually contributed $78,000 in addition to the loan proceeds to the
joint venture.
DARRYLL K. JONES, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 37 (2d ed. 2007).
Mr. Diamond sold his profit interest less than one month later, recognizing $40,000 in short
term capital gain. The government argued, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that Diamond
realized $40,000 upon grant of the profit interest, taxable as ordinary income. Diamond, 492
F.2d at 286. For a thorough discussion of the current doctrinal rules pertaining to the grant
of a "profit interest" (i.e. a vested right to share in the future profits from business activity),
see JONES, supra, at 36-44.
30 See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 (stating that the government would not tax a
recipient of a profit interest, except in very limited circumstances); see also Abrams, supra
note 11, at 185 n. 15 (stating that the current rules with regard to the taxation of carried
interests are based on administrative convenience and describing a conversation with a
former IRS Chief Counsel confirming that position). Another commentator flatly asserts
that both the IRS and the tax bar made painstaking efforts to avoid the issue altogether:
The desire of the IRS and the courts to avoid addressing the Diamond issue has
been revealed on many occasions. Primarily, three approaches have been
employed to avoid dealing directly with Diamond: (1) framing the issue as whether
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dictated entirely by expediency, even if the subsequent consequences
resulting in the status quo were unanticipated. Instead, the grant of a profit
interest makes it necessary to determine what, precisely, the law as an
expression of popular will means by "income." As a reductionist matter, it
may be legitimately concluded that income is a function of the increased
ability to eat or spend. 3' That is, income occurs concurrently with an
increase in eating or spending power. Timing is necessarily implicit in
what society means by income. The mere financial appreciation in stored
property rights, though it may represent income in a strictly economic
sense, is not income in the populist sense because the owner has not yet
taken steps or been presented with circumstances that increase her ability to
eat or spend. Instead, the more often asserted convention with respect to a
carried interest is that the taxpayer has income but the alleged inability to
precisely value that income justifies a rule pretending otherwise.33 This,
however, is an unnecessarily sophisticated means to an end. The receipt of
currency is conventionally thought to eliminate valuation difficulties. Yet
the service provider is an employee versus a partner; (2) focusing on the absence
of value of the profits interest; or (3) characterizing the service provider's
contribution as property within the meaning of section 721.
Carolyn S. Nachmias, Using Profits to Compensate a Service Provider-Potential
Partnership Characterization, 21 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1125, 1145-46 (1994).
31 Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining income as
"undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion"). In my efforts to reduce the meaning of income to a purest form, I
have often asserted that income occurs when someone's real and present ability to "eat or
spend" has increased. In less reductionist terms, my view of income is influenced by the
liquidity of that which is received. Though the receipt may have ascertainable value, the
failure of liquidity-that is, the ability to personally utilize the receipt or convert it to
something that can be personally utilized-seems to me sufficient to preclude application of
the label "income" and thus the present imposition of tax liability. See, e.g., Sergio Pareja,
Taxation Without Liquidation: Rethinking "Ability to Pay, " 5 Wis. L. REv. 841 (2008).
Arguably, liquidity in monetary terms is already an explicit condition precedent to the
present application of the term "income" because Glenshaw Glass included the phrase
"clearly realized, and over which the taxpayer ha[s] complete dominion." 348 U.S. at 431.
See Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REv. 355,
360-65 (2004) (discussing the role of liquidity on the decision to impose or postpone
taxation). The notion is presented here only in topical form because the article is not about
the alleged deferral arising from the decision not to tax the grant of a profit interest. I am not
attempting a complete exposition of the deferral issue here.
32 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
33 In Campbell v. Comm 'r, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the inability to
determine a precise value on a profit interest prevented the present imposition of a tax
liability. 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991). Read together, then, Diamond and Campbell
stand for the proposition that a profit interest is taxable compensation for services only when
the compensation is capable of easy valuation. The significant point of this synthesis,
though, is the recognition that the recipient receives compensation for human labor.
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valuation is, in every non-cash transaction, a subjective matter. If valuation
difficulties were indeed sufficient to postpone tax liability the law should do
so in a host of other situations as well. Valuation, in other words, is an
overly broad justification for the decision to forego immediate taxation.
With respect to carried interests, the law ought to instead acknowledge the
populist notion that it is simply not right to exact a payment from a citizen
whose own consumptive ability has not yet matured. Deferral, defined as
the present receipt of income coupled with an illegitimately postponed
obligation to contribute to the public fisc, 34 does not result from the untaxed
receipt of a profit interest for services. Even though the grant is capable of
quantification in monetary terms,35 it is not income as that term is popularly
understood.3 6 The point is not irrelevant; the question becomes whether the
passage of time ought to transform the circumstances under which the
receipt was granted into circumstances that justify taxation at a lower rate.
That is, whether the circumstances preventing the application of the label
"income" changes by the passage of time such that the rate that would have
applied earlier should not apply at the later time when the ability to eat or
spend has in fact objectively increased.
Historically, the law answered the latter question in the affirmative,37
34 The textual definition of "deferral" is often implicit in any discussion of tax deferral.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation, 52
TAX L. REV. 45 (1996); Christopher H. Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 52 SMU L. REV.
383 (1999). The Judiciary, too, uses the term "deferral" in the same pejorative sense used in
the text. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 348, 354 (1990):
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960, a foreign
corporation controlled by U.S. shareholders was ordinarily not subject to U.S. tax
on foreign source income. The income became subject to U.S. tax only when it
took the form of dividends distributed to the U.S. shareholders. President
Kennedy, in 1961, characterized this tax deferral as undesirable and advocated its
elimination in developed countries and in situations involving low-tax jurisdictions
known as "tax havens."
Sometimes, of course, tax deferral is used to provide incentive for certain types of spending,
as is the case with retirement savings. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401 (2006). When used with
respect to the carried interest debate, though, the phrase is most often used pejoratively.
35 Lee A. Sheppard, Blackstone Proves Carried Interests Can Be Valued, 115 TAx NOTES
1236 (2007).
36 Imputed income is a more often stated example of wealth left untaxed largely because
populist notions do not include such wealth as income. See generally Thomas Chancellor,
Imputed Income and the Ideal Income Tax, 67 OR. L. REV. 561, 605-09 (1988).
37 Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191; Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. Even after
the court in Diamond ruled that the grant of profit interest was a taxable event, most
partnership tax attorneys, with the IRS's implicit (if not explicit) consent simply ignored the
ruling and continued to advise clients that no taxes were due upon grant of the interest.
Jones, supra note 10, at 867.
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but not because circumstances-those existing at the time eating or
spending ability objectively increased-changed in any substantive way.
Rather, because by the time the eating or spending power objectively
increased, the recipient's semantic status changed from that of service
provider (i.e. "employee") to that of owner (i.e. "partner").38 By the mere
change in labels occasioned by the passage of time, the taxpayer
manufactured the ability to receive a preference based on factors unrelated
to whatever substantive justification exists for the preferential treatment.39
Two points should be made explicit with regard to the foregoing
analysis. First, populism may sometimes be the expression of an incorrect
notion. There are notorious historical examples to prove that point.
Slavery and segregation, for example, were populist notions incorrect from
inception; so too was national socialism. That populism may ultimately be
admitted as incorrect does not mean that populism is never a legitimate
underlying source of correctness or that it is never "fair" or "right." Quite
38 In most cases, the character of a partner's income is determined by analyzing the
relationship between the income and the partnership, rather than between the income and the
individual partner. I.R.C. § 702(b) (2008) states:
The character of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit included in a
partner's distributive share under paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) shall
be determined as if such item were realized directly from the source from which
realized by the partnership, or incurred in the same manner as incurred by the
partnership.
39 If a service partner is compensated by receipt of a share of the fund's profits, the
character of that compensation is determined by reference to characterization of that amount
vis-A-vis the partnership. Id.
40 Populism is often asserted as a counter-weight to those whose sophisticated rhetoric is
presumed to elevate the substantive correctness of their arguments. Professor Weinstein, for
example, states:
The combination of socialism, capitalism, and populism intersected to form the
"three categories" that [Stanley P.] Caine concludes lay at the heart of
progressivism: "more direct democratic control over government, new forms of
taxation to eliminate privilege and assure more equitable distribution of society's
benefits, and the strict control (if not public ownership) of monopolies." In other
words, although the Progressive Era is identified as roughly the first two decades
of the twentieth century, it must be understood as the continuation of political
conflict that significantly predates reformist political activism.
Jack Russell Weinstein, On The Meaning of the Term Progressive: A Philosophical
Investigation, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2006) (quoting Stanley P. Caine, The
Origins of Progressivism, in THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Lewis L. Gould ed., 1974)) (citations
omitted). I make no effort to obscure the fact that the assertions in this Article are indeed
populist notions precisely because I do not concede the idea that herd mentality or
majoritarian indignation underlying the initial response to the taxation of carried interests is
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the contrary is true. The tax code, despite its relationship to the science of
economics, is an expression of populist ideals. 41 It is the minority, not the
majority, of populist notions that are incorrect; though when populism runs
amuck the circumstances can be dire. Proponents may be tempted to
discount the foregoing discussion of populism as unworthy of consideration
merely because a super-majority of citizens adhere to the belief embodied
therein. This, though, is an over-indictment since laws are inevitably
expressions of populist notions however much they may be articulated in
high minded terms or obscured by little understood lexicon. Populism, the
collective judgment of a super-majority, is more often right than it is wrong.
Hence, one cannot simply discount the idea that the grant of a promise to
pay speculative amounts in the future-though capable of monetary
valuation and subject to trade-is not the proper occasion to levy a tax.
That the grant is not immediately subject to taxation does mean the
conclusion to forego taxation constitutes "deferral."
The second point to be made in this regard is that the accounting
convention indicating that the grant recipient's receipt is valueless is just
that-a convention expediently used to signal the decision not to impose
taxation; it cannot logically be a record that a service provider has worked
for nothing.42 In Diamond, for example, the taxpayer entered into a joint
effort to make money with another taxpayer.4  Diamond contributed
services-sweat equity4 4-to the joint effort; his services were both
valuable in monetary terms and subject to market demand. The other joint
venturer's contribution consisted of approximately $78,000. An accounting
depiction of the joint venture's balance sheet would appear as follows:
45
necessarily misguided. Instead, I tend to agree with Professor Weinstein's further point that,
"[p]opulism is not an economic theory in the same category as socialism and capitalism.
However, as each of these theories carry within them presumed and preferred political
structures, as well as implications for political participation, it seems reasonable to
understand populism as a counter-force to the other two." Id. at 7 n.30.
41 See Pollack, supra note 27, at 491.
42 Even the proponents of the status quo ante agree with this assertion. See,
e.g.,Weisbach, supra note 8, at 734 (2008) ("If we really wanted to put a number on the value
of a profits interest, however, we could do so, and zero is clearly not the right number."); see
also Postlewaite, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15) ("the current approach under the Code is
to value the property interest upon its receipt by the service provider and treat only that
amount as a return on human capital in the year of receipt."). Professor Postlewaite later
asserts that service partners currently include the value of their partnership interest in income
presumably to be taxed at ordinary rates, without addressing the accounting fiction that
causes the income to be valued at zero. "Upon receipt, [service partners] are taxed on the
basis of their current liquidation value .... " Id. at 26.
43 Diamond, 492 F.2d at 286-87.
44 See Chris Sanchirico, Taxing the Carry: The Problematic Analogy to Sweat Equity,
117 TAX NOTES 239, 240 (2007).
45 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (2008) (regarding the capital accounting rules
pertaining to partnerships).
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Assets Liabilities and Partner's Capital
Real AB BK Liabilities: 1,100,000
Property 1,178,000 1,178,000 Capital: AB BK
Diamond 0 0
Kargman 78,000 78,000
Although, as an accounting matter, Diamond received no quantified
ownership for his services, (as a result his capital contribution to the joint
venture is depicted as zero) his services were most assuredly not worthless
as an economic matter.46 To conclude otherwise would be senseless.
People simply do not consider their labor valueless; they do not work for
nothing. Thus, the transaction's accounting depiction is misleading as a
substantive matter, though temporarily useful as a tool to implement the
decision to postpone taxation of Diamond upon the grant of his profit
interest. As discussed in greater detail below, proponents argue that
Diamond is, in fact, being taxed according to normative standards. It just
so happens, they argue, that his earned income is zero.47  Any further
accretions, according to the argument, are not derived from his services but
from his "invested" capital. That his invested capital is zero is a
nonsensical but expedient convention upon which the argument to tax
further accretions as capital gain is necessary. As pointed out above, it
makes populist sense to conclude that Diamond's tax obligation is zero at
the time the profit interest is. granted; it makes no sense, however, to
conclude that when the yield from the services is finally realized, it is not
actually a yield from services but instead a yield from invested capital.
Nevertheless, in two administrative pronouncements issued after
Diamond, the IRS concluded that Diamond's yield would be treated as the
yield from invested capital and thus potentially taxed as capital gain rather
than ordinary income.48 The IRS made this decision in response to
practitioners' assertions that valuation issues made the problems attendant
to the accurate taxation of recipients insurmountable and therefore
46 Diamond, 492 F.2d at 287.
47 Postlewaite, supra note 19.
48 In Campbell, the Court rejected the government's effort to disavow Diamond's holding
that the receipt of a profit interest for services provided to a partnership resulted in
compensation taxed at ordinary income rates. 943 F.2d at 818. Nevertheless, the court
stated that the profit interest was so incapable of valuation that taxation should not occur
upon its grant. Significantly, the court left intact the earlier holding that the income should,
at some point in time, be taxed as compensation to which ordinary rates applied. The
problem to which the court devoted its attention was timing, not characterization of income.
Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191 and Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 require that
when payments with respect to a profit interest is finally included in income, that it be so
included under the rules applicable to partnership taxation.
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contributed to an unacceptable level of uncertainty in the tax code. 49 The
point is relevant here because it belies the argument that service partners are
"taxed" just like any other service recipient and therefore the taxation of
carried interest is not an anomaly but rather consistent with the taxation of
all other service recipients. The ultimate proof, then, is that there is no
logical support for the claim that the taxation of carried interests is
normative, since no other service provider anywhere in the tax code is
considered as having worked for nothing. Valuation difficulties are instead
met with the assertion that almost nothing is incapable of valuation. 50 To
the contrary, service providers are normally treated as having received
something of value, and only the yield from that previously taxed
reinvested amount is taxed at preferential capital gains rates.
Finally, two situational factors should be recalled in explanation of the
decision not to tax the grant of a carried interest as ordinary income. The
first concerns the assumption that no revenue would be lost from assuming
that the profit interest had no value at the time of its grant because the
amount of income would precisely equal the deduction granted to the
beneficiary of the service provider's efforts. 51 Hence, taxing the recipient
would necessarily imply the grant of a deduction to the other partners,
which deduction would precisely offset any revenue from income inclusion.
The second situational factor concerns the assumption that subsequent
amounts paid to the service provider as a result of partnership operations
would normally result from ordinary business operations, thus producing
gains taxed at ordinary income rates.52 Substantive analysis aside, these
assumptions support a pragmatic determination-i.e., the tax equivalent of
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion-to treat the grant of a carried
interest as a nontaxable event and subsequent yields to the service provider
as "partner" as inevitably characterized by reference to the partnership's
normal business operations.53
49 See Jones, supra note 10, at 867-71 (describing practitioner response to Diamond).
50 See Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(iii) (1994) (stating that it is "[o]nly the rare and
extraordinary" case that property cannot be valued). Tax law has long since expressed
strong skepticism for the proposition that even a variable right to receive wealth is incapable
of valuation. See generally Jeffery L. Kwall, Out with the Open Transaction Doctrine: A
New Theory for Taxing Contingent Payment Sales, 81 N.C. L. REv. 977 (2003).
51 Compare I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)(2009) (regarding the inclusion of compensation in gross
income) with I.R.C. § 162(a)(1)(2009) (regarding a deduction for compensation paid). See
also Knoll, supra note 11.
52 See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not All Carried Interests are Created Equal, 29 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 713, 717 (2009) (noting that "hedge funds rarely hold investments for more
than a short period of time or with any significant exposure to long-term price fluctuations"
and thus are more likely to produce short term capital gain taxed at ordinary rates).
53 In other words, since in most cases the yield to the carried interest (at least with regard
to hedge funds) will normally be taxed as ordinary income, the law should not be so
concerned with the theoretical possibility that the application of I.R.C. § 702(b) (2009) to the
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Significantly, the record of the decision contains none of the
justifications belatedly put forth by proponents in support of capital gain
treatment of the value of carried interests, whether at grant or when the
grant results in actual payment.54
It is impossible that any such justifications could be made, a point
offered here to prove the implication of this Article's title. Capital gains
rates have always been justified as a consequence of objective economics. 55
A very simple example suffices. Suppose a service provider earns $100
(net after tax) during a time when annual inflation is six percent. The $100
is previously taxed (or exempted) and, of course, should not be taxed again
to the same taxpayer. If the taxpayer buys property for $100, and after one
year sells the property for $106, she will reap and pay tax on six dollars
nominal gain. This is the case even though she is no richer than when she
invested the $100 in the property one year ago. She has a nominal gain
under I.R.C. § 1001 but no economic gain; her ability to consume is no
greater than it was one year ago. Her $106 endowment one year later gives
her no more purchasing power than she had one year earlier. Thus, taxing
the six dollars nominal gain amounts to an additional tax on the same
accession to wealth.56 The upshot of this economic result is that the
carry recipient will result in service compensation being taxed at capital gain rates. The
author notes, of course, that private equity funds typically hold investments for longer
periods of time and thus are more likely to generate capital gain. I discuss this observation
in greater detail below.
54 Diamond, 492 F.2d at 287.
55 See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 TAX L. REv. 319 (1993) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the reasons
for capital gain taxation). Proponents of the status quo assert that tax law has never
sufficiently defined the theoretical underpinnings of capital gain taxation. See, e.g.,
Weisbach, supra note 8, at 742 ("Unfortunately, there is little if any conceptual clarity
governing the distinction between capital gain and ordinary income."). If this assertion is
true, then the taxation of carried interests differently from other income is ultimately
arbitrary and thus the case for preference is even weaker. Though the justifications for
capital gain taxation may prove weak, they have nevertheless been identified and generally
agreed upon at least since 1957. See Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital
Gains Arguments, 35 TAXEs 247 (1957). It therefore seems surprising, at best, and
disingenuous, at worst, to claim conceptual obscurity with respect to the asserted reasons for
capital gain taxation. See also Rosenzweig, supra note 52, at 725 n.55 (citations omitted):
It is arguable whether the capital gains preference is the optimal way to fulfill this
policy, or whether it does so at all. ... It is clear, however, that these are the
stated policies for the capital gain preference and that the rules crafted with respect
to it have been justified in this manner, regardless of their efficacy.
56 Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 55, at 337 ("One of the principal arguments used to
support the preference is that capital gains are largely inflationary. To that extent, they do
not represent economic income and should not be included in a base with Haig-Simons
income as the norm."). Even if proponents do not accept the argument, there is at least
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taxpayer who earns or is given $100 is better off selfishly and immediately
consuming it, instead of investing it long term, which would presumably
generate greater societal benefit than immediate consumption. 57 She avoids
double taxation by consuming the $100 immediately. If she invests her
$100, notwithstanding the double taxation, she is better off not selling the
investment one year later even if, from a societal standpoint, there are
higher and better uses for her previously taxed capital. She might continue
her original investment in the manufacture of manual typewriters, for
example, when laptops are all the rage. This latter point is referred to as the
"lock-in" effect.5
enough historical evidence that tax scholars generally concede knowledge of the argument.
See, e.g., Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. 63, 66 (1872):
The mere fact that property has advanced in value between the date of its
acquisition and sale does not authorize the imposition of the tax on the amount of
the advance. Mere advance in value in no sense constitutes the gains, profits, or
income specified by the statute. It constitutes and can be treated merely as increase
of capital.
See also Bumet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932) ("The capital gains preference was
adopted to relieve the taxpayer from these excessive burdens on gains resulting from a
conversion of capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on
such conversions.").
57 See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 55, at 345-46:
Whether the lock-in effect attributable to the tax burden imposes a significant onus
on the economy as a whole is less clear. Although an individual may benefit
greatly by changing her portfolio, it is not clear that it matters much to society who
owns IBM stock. Trading in marketable securities (a significant source of capital
gains), for example, has only marginal effects on the economy as a whole and is
not likely to increase the total amount of investment. While lock-in discourages
some investors from selling stock and investing in venture capital, this is not a
common case. If the real objection to lock-in is the difficulty in directing assets to
venture capital, the preference should be redefined. Even if lock-in does not
significantly burden the economy as a whole, it certainly burdens those holding
appreciated assets and those not holding assets at all because they must pay higher
taxes than they otherwise would have.
58 Id. at 344. The author states:
The lock-in effect describes an investor's reluctance to incur a tax on realization of
gains; it is a direct consequence of prior decisions to impose a realization
requirement and not to tax gains at death. An investor who is not taxed until
realization and who can avoid tax altogether by holding an asset until death, tends
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Implicit, too, in the foregoing example is that there has been a
beneficial "savings" 59-referred to economically as "investment"-of
previously taxed or exempted income. 60 To exonerate her from double
taxation, the tax code imposes "rough justice"'', by lowering the rate of tax
on the nominal gain in an effort to alleviate double taxation. In contrast to
the sophisticated analysis employed by proponents, the case against capital
gain taxation of the carried interest is entirely simple. First, that which is
invested to produce the gain from carried interest has not previously been
taxed. The capital gain treatment of carried interest might be justified if
that which service providers invested-their human endowment-had
previously been taxed.62  Assume, for example, that a fund manager's
expertise was worth $100 in year one and she was taxed on that amount
when the rate of inflation was six percent. If the same expertise yielded
$106 in compensation one year later and she was taxed on the six dollars
nominal gain, we could easily conclude that she was being taxed in the
absence of any increase in consumption power. Her $106 endowment in
year two could not have increased her consumption power from year one.
Hence, the tax on the nominal gain would essentially be a tax on the present
value of the amount on which she had previously been taxed. The
foregoing analysis hinges, for its logical correctness, on the assumption that
tax law imposes a levy on human endowment and then again on the
conversion of that endowment into cash. If that were the case, the law
would be justified in applying a lower rate on the conversion of human
endowment into cash under the theory that the future cash value to which
the endowment is converted is the inflationary equivalent to the present
59 Id. at 376-80 (evaluating the argument that a capital gains preference encourages
savings and is therefore beneficial to society).
60 Although Professor Rosenzweig does not sufficiently address the inflation justification
for capital gains taxation, he does allow that the problem to which the capital gains
preference is directed does not exist unless a taxpayer has made an investment of her own
financial capital. Rosenzweig, supra note 52, at 725.
A fundamental aspect of the bunching and lock-in phenomenon is that they require
an upfront investment in an asset and gain derived from that investment; in other
words, the gain subject to bunching and lock-in is the return on the initial capital
investment. In the case of carried interest in a private equity fund, however, there
is nominally no upfront capital investment by the GP. Rather, the GP is effectively
earning a return generated on the investment of capital contributed to the fund by
the LPs.
Id
61 Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 55, at 338.
62 For an in-depth discussion on the notion of taxing unexploited human ability (i.e.
human endowment or human capital), see Lawrence Zelenack, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE
L.J. 1145 (2006).
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value of the previously taxed endowment. Logically, the owner of human
endowment would derive greater utility using that endowment in a manner
that does not produce a cash or cash equivalent conversion; the law would
encourage leisure over work. The conversion would ultimately result in
less utility to the owner because of the "double tax"; as a macro economic
matter, society would be worse off as a result.
In the prototypical carried interest case, fund managers have never
been taxed on anything prior to their investment of human capital in the
fund. The tax on whatever yield arises is the first tax, since the law does
not tax people on their mere potential to earn. Only if the law taxed people
on earning potential, and then again upon the financial realization of that
potential should we rightly be concerned about double taxation and the
discouragement of converting human capital into cash. Moreover, the
natural imperative to get a job precludes the lock-in phenomenon.
Axiomatically, taxpayers would rather earn sustenance than forego even a
single tax on the yield from their labor. Clearly, then, neither double
taxation nor the lock-in effect justifies the application of capital gain tax
rates to fund manager compensation.
The foregoing discussion of the classic reasons justifying lower rates
on returns to capital than on returns to labor are implicitly based on what
we mean by "income." As noted earlier, income is a term that signals the
increased ability to eat or spend and thus the increased ability to contribute
to the public good. Proponents do not challenge these justifications.
Instead, they rely on a less often stated justification for capital gain rates.
Proponents assert that a service provider who agrees to be compensated not
by a risk free cash or cash equivalent form of compensation, but by a risky
form of compensation based on the venture's probability of success is
thereby deserving of lower taxation.63
Ultimately, we are obliged to assume that ordinary rates constitute the
legitimate baseline of taxation. Here, again, the baseline is not a matter of
objective science or deduction but merely an expression of popular will.
Implicit in proponents' arguments is that the extent to which a taxpayer
risks transferring her services for no compensation-as is the case when a
taxpayer agrees to be compensated only if the venture proves successful-
she is entitled to a reward in the form of lower tax rates. This, of course, is
an argument in subsidy. 64 That is, the venture to which the taxpayer places
her compensation at risk is a public good that ought to be subsidized by the
public fisc.
63 See Postlewaite, supra note 19 (arguing that since non-equity service provider
compensation involves no risk, employees are different from fund manger service providers
and thus not entitled to the capital gain preference).
64 Brennan & Okamoto, supra note 11, at 31 ("A lower tax on one activity may fairly be
described as a subsidy since the lower tax cost favors one activity over another.").
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The notion that normal or even enhanced risk-taking justifies the
application of capital gains tax rates to fund managers is not entirely
novel, 65 but nevertheless proves too much. Every entrepreneur is a risk-
taker, but only entrepreneurial investors of previously taxed income are
taxed at lower rates, and that is not because they are risk-takers, but for the
reasons discussed above.66 Suppose, for example, that a taxpayer buys 100
lemons to start a lemonade stand or simply to corner the market on lemons.
She hopes to sell lemons or lemonade at a nice profit. The return on her
strategy is, quite naturally, risky. The risk may be very high or very low,
depending on market circumstances. There is no guarantee that she will sell
one, ten, fifty, or one hundred lemons worth of lemonade. In any event, it
is both unnecessary and unwise to provide a tax subsidy to her risk-taking
merely because of the existence of risk. The market will reward or punish
her risk-taking as the case may be. When the market punishes risk, it
disciplines investors to the benefit of society. Softening that potential
punishment via a tax break encourages irrational risk-taking and ought to be
tolerated only when there is a demonstrable societal benefit that is not
otherwise provided via market reward. Indeed, as fund manager
compensation figures have historically shown, the market more than
adequately spurs the risk-taking that fund managers indulge when they put
their service compensation to the mercy of entrepreneurial risk.67 The
subsidy embodied in capital gains taxation is, in this instance, unnecessary
and unjustified because neither the double tax nor lock-in potential is
sufficiently present-the lemons being the stuff of inventory and therefore
not likely to generate mere inflationary (or nominal) gain, or to cause
capital to be diverted to unproductive use such as leisure or sloth. The more
important point is that risk-taking has nothing to do with capital gains
taxation. Every investment-whether of human or financial capital-
involves risk. A theory that capital gains taxation is appropriate for risk-
taking proves too much and is nothing more than a selective plea for lower
65 Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 55, at 340-44 (discussing the risk justification for
capital gain treatment).
66 Id. at 343. The authors state:
The definition of capital asset is not in any way targeted toward "risky"
investments. There is no reason to think that financial investments in stocks and
bonds are any riskier than a direct investment in a new business. Indeed, because
an investor can diversify, existing financial instruments may be among the least
risky investments available.
Id.
67 See supra text accompanying note 7. Even if the market did not sufficiently
compensate for perceived increased risk, a tax subsidy would remain unnecessary until such
time as it were proven that the undersupplied goods or services were of such importance that
government ought to subsidize them.
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tax rates for certain activities, some or all of which might occur in the
absence of the subsidy.68
The latter assertion perhaps overstates the case to the extent capital
gains taxation can legitimately be viewed as a disguised subsidy (rather
than as a remedy) to spur what should otherwise be "irrational" but
nevertheless extremely beneficial societal behavior. Two examples suffice
in this regard. The first pertains to the research and development tax
credit.69 We might conceptualize the research and development tax credit
as an effectively lower tax rate applied to income directed towards a certain
needed and socially beneficial activity that would insufficiently occur
without a tax subsidy. 70 The effective rate on income used for research and
development is zero because the financial cost (i.e. risk) of research and
development is so high that rational people ought to spend their labor and
money elsewhere. Rational behavior might result in an undersupply of a
public good. Providing a lower tax rate via a credit encourages highly risky
but nevertheless socially beneficial behavior not sufficiently provided by
market incentives. Another example involves serving in combat. The tax
rate on combat pay (zero percent) is lower than the tax rate on other
services. 71 Engaging in combat is a risky, irrational behavior with such
little hope of sufficient financial reward that we should expect it never to
occur without something to offset the risk. Here, I am speaking only in the
economic terms the proponents of capital gain taxation have used in the
debate. Nevertheless, in an economic sense, there is insufficient hope of
market reward to motivate those socially beneficial activities. It is only
68 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 10th CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED
ISSUES PART I 56 (JCX-62-07) (2007):
The risk argument can be criticized, however, in that the capital gains rates apply
to the disposition of capital assets, not to risk-taking in general that does not
involve capital assets. Further, the capital gains tax rates apply to the disposition
of capital assets that are not risky, or have little risk, such as the sale of U.S.
Treasury debt with a yield close to the risk-free rate of return. Moreover, the
capital gains tax rates do not apply to many types of income related to risk-taking.
For example, capital gains rates do not apply to employee compensation that is
performance-based, contingent on meeting sales targets or other performance
measures. To the extent that the fund manager is risking his time and effort, but
not his money, it is argued that the risk rationale for capital gains treatment does
not apply.
69 I.R.C. § 41 (2008). For a discussion of the use of the research credit and deduction to
spur research and economic growth, see William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for Research
and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J. 347 (1987).
70 Natbony, supra note 69, at 350.
71 I.R.C. § 112 (2009) (providing for the exclusion from gross income the pay and
compensation earned while serving in a combat zone).
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when that conclusion can be made objectively-that the market
insufficiently provides needed services-that deviations from normative
taxation is justified. The assertion simply cannot be made with regard to
services as a fund manager because the hope of financial reward (as
opposed to the guarantee) is so high that the socially beneficial behavior
will inevitably occur in sufficient quantities.
The foregoing analysis proves, without reliance on sophistry or
situational ethics-such as might be appropriate if the market failed to
provide sufficient reward to motivate needed services-that neither
economic nor subsidy justifications support the application of capital gains
taxation to the grant of a carried interest. Indeed, the proponents'
arguments inadvertently lend credence to that conclusion and, since their
expedient arguments are easily addressed they ultimately concede the issue.
In Section IV, then, the Article addresses a representative sample of those
arguments directly. A close analysis proves instead that proponents
actually agree with the inapplicability of capital gain justifications to the
carried interest. Nevertheless, proponents make arguments based either on
semantics or more sophistry and expediency; they rely, for example, on the
indisputable fact that a service partner is correctly treated as a partner under
common law, that service partners might otherwise structure their
transactions using certain legal fictions to achieve valuable conversion, or
the administrative complexities attendant to the ordinary income treatment
of carried interests would raise less revenue than simply indulging the
incorrect application of fundamental tax theory to achieve the status quo.
None of these arguments provide the sense of integrity that ought to
characterize a body of law meant to apply equally to all persons subject to
its provisions.
IV. THE SOPHISTRY OF RESISTANCE
The most telling aspect of the various arguments offered in support of
the status quo is that they all implicitly admit that taxing fund managers for
their services in a manner preferential to the compensation received by
other service providers is contrary to horizontal equity. This Article selects
three scholarly assertions as representative of the body of literature in
support of the status quo. The first scholarly assertion is that the return
from the carried interest is not a return to labor but instead a return to
"blended" labor and capital. 72 The assertion is similar to that made by the
third scholarly argument confronted here; that the carried interest results not
from an expenditure of human capital but rather an investment of human
capital.73 This Article proves the first assertion false, at least insofar as the
72 See Postlewaite, supra note 19; Weisbach, supra note 8, at 755.
73 See Postlewaite, supra note 19.
Sophistry and the Carried Interest
29:675 (2009)
reasons for capital gain taxation are concerned. The third assertion is
flawed because it conflates the initial grant of the carried interest, resulting
from what the proponent refers to an as "expenditure," with the yield from
the carried interests. According to this argument the yield results from an
"investment" rather than an "expenditure" of human capital, and therefore,
is rightly taxed as capital gain.74 To account for the lack of previous
taxation, the proponent argues that the yield from the original expenditure,
as opposed to the later investment, is indeed included in income and taxed
at ordinary rates. According to the proponent, the amount is coincidentally
valued at zero. 5 Whatever the ordinary rate may be, when it is applied to
an amount quantified as zero, it fortuitously results in zero tax liability.
With due respect to the proponent, this Article categorically labels that path
sophistry because the original tax rate of zero is a mere accounting
construct useful solely to signal the populist notion that the grant is not an
appropriate moment of taxation.76
The second argument is equally flawed. It holds that since carried
interest recipients could replicate the preferential outcome via a fictional
"loan," which would be respected as a matter of form, the law should
indulge the status quo as well. 77  In other words, since recipients could
effectively cheat to achieve conversion, they ought to be allowed to do so in
the most direct and least expensive manner available. The factual predicate,
one that this Article proves incorrect, is that the fictional loan necessary to
achieve the outcome would precisely replicate the economic bargain
between the fund managers and investors whose cooperation is needed for
the conversion. Thus, both fund managers and investors would be
indifferent as to which path to utilize, except for the additional transactional
costs required by the use of the fictional loan. Each of these arguments sets
aside the intrinsic moral value of integrity in the tax code. From a purist
viewpoint-one which ultimately increases social utility to a greater extent
than sophistry and situational ethics-reliance on these arguments is simply
unacceptable.
A. The Disposition of Patently Incorrect Arguments
Before analyzing the proponents' arguments, it is appropriate to briefly
74 Postlewaite, supra note 19 (manuscript at 9 n.19). Postlewaite states that "employee
compensation [correctly taxed as ordinary income] can be viewed as the expenditure of
human capital, while equity compensation involves the investment of human capital." Id. It
is unclear, and indeed inconsistent with present law, why the form of payment with respect
to skill or labor should change the character of the income. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)
(2003) (treating all compensation alike, whether paid in cash, property, or services).
75 See Postlewaite, supra note 19.
76 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
77 See Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried Interest Controversy:
Let's Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAx L. REV. 121 (2008).
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address three other common consequentialist 78 objections, which relate to a
fundamental notion that is sometimes intentionally disregarded in
Subchapter K. First, Subchapter K intentionally requires that a partner's
allocated share of income be characterized at the partnership level. 79 Thus,
a taxpayer, who enters into a partnership that has held stock for more than
one year is entitled to report long term capital gain from the sale of that
stock even if the sale occurs one day after the partner's entry into the
partnership.80 It matters not that the partner held her proportionate share of
the stock for merely one day. From this rule, proponents argue that the
partner level characterization is a necessary consequence of the
congressional intent animating partnership taxation. Simply put,
proponents argue that partnership level characterization of income is
inviolate. That is, the benefit of the rule is so great that it ought to be
followed even in the rare circumstances where it causes a distortion of the
partner's true circumstances. Once the label "partner" attaches, all further
tax decisions are simply a matter of applying a straightforward rule.
Unfortunately, the argument is belied by a very conspicuous provision in
Subchapter K. I.R.C. § 724 represents a clear departure from partnership
level characterizations. Other than the relatively simple record keeping
required for compliance, the provision requires nothing else than that a
partner who contributes ordinary gain or capital loss property be allocated
ordinary gain or capital loss when the partnership sells or exchanges the
property, notwithstanding that the property may qualify as capital gain or
ordinary loss property, respectively, when owned by the partnership.8' In
78 This term is used to refer to the notion necessarily implicit in proponents' advocacy for
the status quo-that conversion is a rarely indulged distortion and in most instances the fund
manager's compensation ends up being taxed as ordinary income anyway. Hence, the
argument goes, insisting that the law comport with 'general tax principles' that tax
compensation as ordinary income is unnecessary because the result will be identical to what
it would be under the status quo. Consequentialism, in effect, argues that the status quo ante
is justified because the correct results ultimately occur in most cases. See, e.g., Weisbach,
supra note 8, at 733 ("Transactions [sic] fees received by the sponsor are taxed under general
tax principles and are most likely taxed as ordinary compensation income. As noted, the
fees represent around two-thirds of sponsor compensation. This means that roughly two-
thirds of sponsor compensation is taxed as ordinary income."). More recent scholarship,
though, suggests that even this consequentialist argument is false. See Gregg D. Polsky,
Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAx NOTES 743, 743 (2009) ("Private
equity managers regularly attempt to convert their fixed annual 2 percent management fees
into additional carried interest through so-called management fee conversions.").
79 I.R.C. § 702(b) (2009). See also U.S. v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
go See also Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (2005).
81 The I.R.C., obviously designed to prevent conversion of ordinary income into capital
gains and capital losses into ordinary losses, provides, in part:
§ 724. Character of gain or loss on contributed unrealized receivables, inventory
items, and capital loss property.
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other words, the partnership level characterization of gain or loss is ignored,
at little efficiency cost, in circumstances suggesting a rather obvious
conversion attempt. That a service partner contributes services rather than
property does not exacerbate whatever administrative difficulties have
already been deemed insufficient to prevent the enactment and enforcement
(a) Contributions of unrealized receivables. In the case of any property which-
(1) was contributed to the partnership by a partner, and
(2) was an unrealized receivable in the hands of such partner immediately before
such contribution,
any gain or loss recognized by the partnership on the disposition of such property
shall be treated as ordinary income or ordinary loss, as the case may be.
(b) Contributions of inventory items. In the case of any property which-
(1) was contributed to the partnership by a partner, and
(2) was an inventory item in the hands of such partner immediately before such
contribution,
any gain or loss recognized by the partnership on the disposition of such property
during the 5-year period beginning on the date of such contribution shall be treated
as ordinary income or ordinary loss, as the case may be.
(c) Contributions of capital loss property. In the case of any property which-
(1) was contributed by a partner to the partnership, and
(2) was a capital asset in the hands of such partner immediately before such
contribution,
any loss recognized by the partnership on the disposition of such property during
the 5-year period beginning on the date of such contribution shall be treated as a
loss from the sale of a capital asset to the extent that, immediately before such
contribution, the adjusted basis of such property in the hands of the partner
exceeded the fair market value of such property.
I.R.C. § 724 (2009). The most relevant legislative history of I.R.C. § 724 articulates the
following anti-conversion purpose:
The committee is concerned that, under certain circumstances, a taxpayer may
alter the character of gain or loss merely by contributing property to a new or
existing partnership. In particular, the conversion of capital to ordinary losses by
contributing securities to a dealer partnership may allow a taxpayer to receive the
benefits of capital gain taxation on appreciated securities while deducting ordinary
losses on those which have declined in value. The committee believes that these
potential abuses should be prevented by preserving the pre-contribution character
of contributed (or substitute basis) property for an appropriate period. For similar
reasons, the committee believes the existing rules preserving the character of
certain property distributed by a partnership should apply to property the basis of
which is determined by reference to the distributed property.
Id.
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of I.R.C. § 724. As addressed in a bit more detail below, administrative
burdens do not justify the clear horizontal inequity that would result in the
absence of I.R.C. § 724.
The second "housekeeping" response relates to the status of the service
provider as "partner" or "employee." Some proponents argue that because
common and tax law clearly allow a contributor of services to gain status as
partner, the law necessarily, as a consequence of that label, presumes that
any gains attributable to the taxpayer's status as partner must be
characterized at the partnership level in accordance with the authorities
discussed immediately above.82 This too is an argument adopted as a
matter of expediency. Subchapter K has long since addressed the mischief
that results when partners receive gain or profit while nominally occupying
the status of partner but substantively performing as an employee or in
some capacity other than a partner. I.R.C. § 707(a) and (c) clearly
contemplate the possibility that a partner may simultaneously or
alternatively perform services or provide property as partner, employee, or
independent contractor. Though the factual inquiry may be detailed, and
subject to obfuscations by the taxpayer and/or the partnership when it suits
their purposes, Congress has not been deterred from determining that the
inquiry ought rightly to be made. 83  In fact, substance has always been
82 See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 8, at 729:
Once a partner receives a profits interest, he is a partner for purposes of the tax law
and is taxed like any other partner. This means that he is taxed on his distributive
share of partnership items. The timing, character, and other attributes of the
income are determined at the partnership level and passed through to the individual
partners under the normal partnership rules.
83 Weisbach, supra note 8, at 731-34. Professor Weisbach argues, in effect, that I.R.C.
§ 707 was not really intended to deal with the problem of partnerships accelerating business
expense deductions (i.e. indirect costs of capital expenditures) by disguising those payments
as allocations. Id. On the other hand, Professor Polsky more accurately points out that
I.R.C. § 707's purpose is much broader and was also specifically intended to prevent the
conversion allowed under the status quo:
Section 707(a)(2)(A) was principally directed at such a transmutation of a capital
expenditure into (effectively) a current deduction. Nevertheless, the legislative
history makes clear that Congress was also aware that artificial partnership
transactions could be used to convert ordinary income to capital gains. It notes
that "if a service-providing partner was allocated a portion of the partnership's
capital gains in lieu of a fee, then the effect of the allocation/distribution will be to
convert ordinary income (compensation for services) into capital gains."
Polsky, supra note 78, at 763 (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, H.R. 4170, 98TH
CONG., Pub. L. No. 97-248, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 227-29 (Comm. Print 1984)).
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preferred over form in tax law. Reliance on a taxpayer's nominal status as
"partner" is therefore just as inconsequential with regard to the carried
interest as a taxpayer's characterization of a sale of property under I.R.C.
§ 707(b) as a contribution followed by a distribution.
The final consequentialist argument to be disposed of is the alleged
lack of value attendant to the grant of a carried interest. Economically, the
grant of a carried interest represents a right to receive an undefined amount
of wealth at some future point. To say that the right has no value is also to
stipulate that the services used to acquire that right have no value. This is
incorrect as a matter of rationality. Why would a person possessing skills
subject to market demand, and without a specific intent to make a donation,
transfer her services for nothing? The short answer is that she would not do
so; she may, though, bargain for deferred compensation and in that case
deferred taxation is appropriate. But there is nothing to support the fiction
that she would labor for nothing. It should be noted, here, that value is not
important as part of an argument to impose taxation on the recipient
immediately upon grant of the carried interest. The Article has previously
set forth the argument in support of the notion that valuation possibility is
not the sole determinate of income. One may be in receipt of something
valuable, yet not be subject to present taxation. Disputing the notion that a
profit interest is incapable of valuation is instead important when
determining the amount that ought to be attributed to services, and thus
taxed at ordinary rates, and the amounts earned from the subsequent
investment of the previously taxed amounts, and thus appropriately taxed at
capital gains rates. Realism and common sense tell us that it is not that the
parties cannot value the services traded in exchange for the future payment
measured as a percentage of profit. It is simply that they refuse to publicly
divulge that worth, each for different reasons perhaps. Surely, they know
that worth, if only because a fund manager can determine the price her
services would bring in a similar industry that disdained agency incentives.
Likewise, the investors can obtain those services at a fixed price from other
willing laborers. The notion that the market is so unpredictable that it
cannot settle upon a reasonable valuation of common services is one for
which the burden ought rightly be placed on those who would benefit from
its acceptance.
B. The Disposition of Sophisticated Arguments
This Article separates the consequentialist arguments discussed and
dismissed above from the consequentialist arguments discussed and
dismissed below by labeling the former "expedient" and the latter
"sophisticated." Both groups of assertions depend on their outcomes; the
outcomes are thought tolerable, and therefore the arguments must be
correct. What transforms the "sophisticated" arguments into sophistry is
that they are flawed in a manner that is hardly obscure. Each argument is
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plausible, in the sense that they would not likely draw sanction if presented
to a court in support of the status quo. However, each argument admits that
the objective status quo is incorrect 84 and relies on a very apparent factual
or logical flaw for its success. 5  What initially seems attractive is
ultimately exposed, ironically, as support for the initial populist, and even
visceral, reaction that the preferential taxation of carried interests cannot be
supported.
The first sophisticated argument is that payments made with respect to
carried interests are improperly characterized as payments for services.
Proponents obscure the problem presented by pointing to the common
practice requiring fund managers to put some of their own capital-
certainly less than the twenty percent of the total committed capital-into
the pooled fund. Thus, even admitting that the profit interest is explicitly
tied to services, proponents nevertheless argue that the service provider's
very nominal "skin in the game" transforms the entirety of their
compensation for services into yield from previously taxed income. 86 A
84 See Rosenzweig, supra note 52. Professor Rosenzweig argues, for example, that the
taxation of yields to human capital ought to be taxed as ordinary income and that to the
extent partnerships allocate only short term capital gain, taxable at ordinary rates, no reform
is necessary. Id. I address the flaw in this argument below.
85 Professor Postlewaite argues that payments made with respect to carried interests
represent yields with respect to both "expended" and "invested" capital and since the initial
expenditure of capital is taxed at ordinary rates, the treatment of carried interests is no more
preferential than the tax treatment of any other service provider. See Postlewaite, supra note
19. I have previously addressed the legal fiction upon which the assertion rests. See supra
notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
86 The "Levin Proposal" introduced in the House of Representatives on June 22, 2007
would have taxed yields with respect to the grant of a carried interest as ordinary income.
By its very terms, though, the provision would not have applied to amounts attributable to
the partner's contribution of financial capital. See H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007). The
relevant portion of the bill stated:
Section 710 ....
(c) Investment Services Partnership Interest ....
(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN CAPITAL INTERESTS-
(A) IN GENERAL-If-
(i) a portion of an investment services partnership interest is acquired on
account of a contribution of invested capital, and
(ii) the partnership makes a reasonable allocation of partnership items between
the portion of the distributive share that is with respect to invested capital and the
portion of such distributive share that is not with respect to invested capital,
then subsection (a) shall not apply to the portion of the distributive share that is
with respect to invested capital. An allocation will not be treated as reasonable for
purposes of this subparagraph if such allocation would result in the partnership
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variant of this argument holds that capital gain taxation presently allows for
preferential treatment of services because the yield to previously taxed
income embodied in property can only be realized by the application of
management services to that previously taxed capital. Under this argument,
capital gain necessarily and intentionally taxes blended labor and capital in
all cases; the taxation of carried interest is therefore consistent with present
law and good economic theory. The factual flaw is that the yield to assets
does not take into account the services performed in the holding,
management, or sale of that asset. 87 A buyer of stock, for example, values
the stock without regard to the intellectual capital expended in the decision
to sell or hold.
Indeed, whatever appreciation may have occurred in the value of the
stock by virtue of previous services will have already been taxed at ordinary
rates. 88  Suppose the owner of a widget store buys, manages, and sells
widgets for a period of three years. During such time, she will have earned
income from the sale or management of her inventory-i.e., the sale of
services or short term assets-which would be taxed at ordinary rates. As
the store's volume increases over and above the amounts derived and taxed
on an annual basis at ordinary rates, the goodwill value of the business
would increase and the owner would decide to sell the business via a stock
or asset sale. As the business represents previously taxed value embodied
allocating a greater portion of income to invested capital than any other partner not
providing services would have been allocated with respect to the same amount of
invested capital.
Id.
87 The tax code defines capital gain as gain derived from the sale or exchange of
property. I.R.C. § 1221 (2009) (defining a capital asset as "property"); I.R.C. § 1222(1) and
(3) (2009) (defining capital gain as that which derives from the sale or exchange of capital
asset). If, indeed, the income from services should be characterized by reference to the
property to which the services are directed (inventory or investment property, for example),
than all service providers who hold, manage, maintain, or sell long term investments should
be taxed at capital gain rates. It is hard not to consider this a nonsensical assertion.
88 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as
Property in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 1, 7 (2005). The classic definition
of goodwill presupposes that goodwill is an intangible asset created over a significant period
of time in which ordinary income transactions occur:
The advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere
value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of
the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives from constant
or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or
reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental
circumstances, or necessities, or even from ancient partialities, or prejudices.
Id.
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in property, it is appropriate to tax the owner only on the true profit made
from the sale; it is economically inappropriate to tax the owner on the value
of that which she already owns-a business whose value has been increased
by the sale of services and inventory resulting in goodwill-and on which
she has been previously taxed. Thus, the sale should produce a tax liability
only to the extent the nominal amount exceeds the business' inflationary
value. The key fact, though, is that the owner has already paid an ordinary
tax on the services that contributed to the accretion in the businesses
value. 89 The factual predicate does not apply when services are performed
with respect to someone else's capital. While it can be proven that double
taxation results with respect to the ongoing exploitation and later sale of
one's own property, it cannot be said with respect to the management of
someone else's property. If compensation for the services is made solely at
the time the third party's property is sold, the management services would
not yet be taxed and double taxation would not need to be alleviated. The
inescapable conclusion is that the blended labor-capital argument does not
apply unless a person owns both the labor and the capital being sold. Even
then, the blended labor-capital argument relies on the fact that the value of
the property sold has been increased by previously taxed yields from
capital.
The second argument amounts to little more than an assertion that a
service provider may achieve conversion through another, economically
costlier analysis and therefore ought to be allowed the benefit of the less
expensive and risky conversion strategy existing under the status quo. The
gist of the argument is that the recipient of a carried interest payment
occupies the economically equivalent status of a nonrecourse loan recipient
who, having received the loan, invests the proceeds in long term assets. 90
Since the loan recipient would be entitled to capital gain treatment, so too
should the fund manager, whose yield is essentially from borrowed capital.
It is no doubt the case that a taxpayer may borrow and invest money to
achieve capital gain taxation. 9' The rationale for this outcome is that the
taxpayer is allowed to pay for the tax beneficial investment after the
investment, when she repayts the loan with previously taxed wealth earned
from some other activity. That is, the taxpayer will be obliged to earn
" Cf I.R.C. § 751(b) (2009) (requiring the seller of a partnership interest to pay tax at
ordinary income rates on property that, had it been sold prior to the sale of the partnership
interest, would have generated ordinary income).
90 The most thorough discussion of this argument is described in Cunningham & Engler,
supra note 77.
9' Id. at 134 n.62.
92 See Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (lamenting the
treatment of purchases made with borrowed capital as an actual investment by the borrower,
but noting that "we do not write on a [clean] slate" and therefore concluding that the
longstanding result should be followed).
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money with which to repay the loan and those earnings will be taxed at
whatever rate otherwise applies to the earnings. Thus, the carry recipient
who is treated as though she has invested her own capital via the loan
analogy is placed on par with all other service providers. Even then, of
course, the ordinary service provider-e.g. an employee rather than a
partner-may be less well off because she must repay her loan from income
taxed at ordinary rates. The fund manager may instead repay her loan from
income taxed at capital gain rates. Here, the circularity of this option
deprives the option of its comfort. Ultimately, the fund manager is granted
access to investor status along with its attendant tax benefit without ever
having to pay the toll that other investors must have paid at least once
before. The fund manager's toll into the capital gains preference is paid
from the very activity giving rise to capital gain. An employee's toll into
the capital gains preference must be paid, at least once, from income taxed
at ordinary rates. Assume, for example, two taxpayers each endowed with
nothing but their natural abilities. Under a system that differentiates
between ordinary and capital gain income, as does ours, neither one would
be entitled to a preferential rate until such time as they expended their
natural endowment, earned a certain yield from that expenditure and then
instead of consuming that yield immediately, invested it long term. Only
the yield from that initial investment of previously taxed income would be
entitled to preferential tax treatment because it was made possible by the
receipt of income taxed at the baseline level applicable to all human labor.
As a matter of efficiency, setting equity aside for the moment, it is unwise
to grant a service provider access to the preferential capital gain rates
without first requiring that the provider expend her human capital. There is
neither efficiency nor social utility to be gained by granting preferential
rates to the lazy or fortuitous. All that is left, then, is inequity.
Applying this analysis to the present taxation of carried interests helps
clarify the inequity. One service provider labors in a certain investment
enterprise, the success of which is as much dependent on the laborer's
loyalty and incentivized expertise as is the service provider who labors for a
wealthier capitalist in a pooled fund. The owners of the business enterprise
cannot or will not abide by the accounting slight of hand embodied in its
laborer being treated as having borrowed and then invested some of their
capital. Thus, the first laborer must earn, save, and then invest her after
[ordinary] tax income before being granted capital gain preference with
respect to any subsequent investment. The laborer who works for the
wealthier capitalist is fortunate that the wealthier capitalist is willing and
able to abide the accounting slight of hand suggesting that the laborer has
actually invested her own capital. Under the implicit loan model, the
second laborer's efforts are economically identical to the first and yet the
second laborer is taxed preferentially to the first. The moral of the
immediately foregoing discussion is that the first laborer ought to convince
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:675 (2009)
the capitalist for whom she labors to indulge the accounting fiction
embodied in the implicit loan analogy or, barring that, offer her labor to the
second capitalist's benefit, perhaps driving down the price of labor in the
second industry and driving up the price of labor in the first. In other
words, the implicit loan is an unnecessary indulgence that has no
boundaries. It is similar to the situational ethic resulting in the status quo
and should predictably result in the same sort of mischief any deviation
from an intellectually pure and honest approach occasions. Indeed, the loan
analogy may be utilized with respect to most any laborer fortunate enough
to gain the cooperation of the financial capital's true owner. Thus, what
seems an expedient means of explaining away a glaring inequity in the tax
code-that embodied in the status quo-will ultimately cause us to regret
its adoption in some as of yet unknown fashion.
The third argument is that carried interests with respect to short term
gains should remain taxed under the status quo because short term capital
gains receive no preference. 93 The implication, of course, is that carried
interests with respect to long term funds ought to be taxed differently than
the status quo. That is, the use of carried interests with respect to short term
fund should not cause any changes in the status quo because the recipient is
taxed at the same rates as other service providers. The reasoning for this
approach is derived from reverse engineering and ultimately relies on a "no
harm, no foul" ethic. In those funds that implement a short term investment
strategy, there is no conversion potential because the yields to that interest
will qualify as short term capital gain, at best. The argument is that since
the gain cannot qualify for long term capital gain treatment, the ultimate
taxation of the yield is correct even if the path to that conclusion is
incorrect. Notwithstanding the explicit admission that the recipient is made
wealthier by the rendition of services, the proponent nevertheless considers
it appropriate to allow the recipient to characterize her income as income
from capital, albeit short term capital taxed at ordinary rates. The problem,
of course, beyond the observation that it requires indulgence of a legal
fiction (that the service provider has sold or exchanged a capital asset) is
that the reasoning is offensive to the purist approach and thus more likely to
spawn troublesome unintended consequences. One such unintended
consequence is that short term capital fains increase the amount of capital
losses deductible in any given year.9  Thus, it is more beneficial to a
service provider, particularly one who has unused capital losses, that her
93 See Rosenzweig, supra note 52.
94 Capital losses are deductible only to the extent of capital gains, plus up to $3000.
I.R.C. § 121 l(b) (2009). The limitation on capital losses is designed to prevent taxpayers
from "cherry-picking"--realizing losses from investments to reduce taxes while deferring
gains from investments. Michelle Amopol Cecil, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the
Internal Revenue Code: A New Paradigm for the Deductibility of Capital Losses, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1083, 1109-11 (1999).
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compensation be labeled short term capital gain rather than ordinary
income. To the extent income may be labeled capital, either long or short,
the taxpayer may accelerate losses that Congress believes ought instead to
be matched with true yields from other investments. For example, a
taxpayer whose short term gain is increased by $100,000 because the
$100,000 yield on her carried interest is characterized as such, is allowed to
increase the amount of her capital loss deduction by that amount. A fund
manager whose $100,000 yield is not so characterized does not suddenly
generate an additional $100,000 capital loss deduction eligibility. One can
imagine that fund managers with significant short term capital gain would
be motivated to characterize their carry payment as short term capital
gain-perhaps even by changing the character of the portfolio's
investments when economic considerations might dictate otherwise-solely
to utilize short term capital losses realized from other sources. This
unintended distortion could be avoided by adhering to the most accurate
description of the carry payment, which is a payment made for services and
thus ordinary income.
A more troublesome aspect of the "holding period" solution is that it
leaves in place the status quo with respect to fund managers of long term
assets. The implication is that fund managers of long term assets would be
allowed to characterize the yields to their carried interest under the
partnership flow-through rules and thus potentially as capital gain. That
short term funds are deprived of long term capital gain treatment under the
proposal because of a failure of holding period necessarily implies that
managers of long term funds would be entitled to capital gain treatment. In
other words, the short term holding period solution actually supports the
status quo, even as the proponent admits that capital gain taxation is
incorrect. The source of this mistake is the proponent's omission of
inflation as a motivation for capital gain taxation. The proponent rightly
notes the two other historical motivations-bunching and lock-in-for
capital gain treatment but omits the problem of taxing inflationary rather
than real gain. That problem arises exclusively when the value embodied in
property has been previously taxed. If, upon the later sale, the asset
produces a nominal amount realized not in excess of its past value, an
additional tax amounts to a tax on the same amount previously taxed. The
problem does not arise with respect to yields from services since no
predecessor tax was ever imposed. Thus, the holding period solution is
really nothing more than an insufficient justification for the status quo.
V. CONCLUSION-A SHORT ESSAY IN LEGAL REALISM
This Article has largely been an exercise in "point-counterpoint."
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:675 (2009)
Proponents responded to the initial, popularly held indignation 95 with
respect to the preferential taxation of carried interests payments first with
silence 96 and then with justifications, all of which revolve around the
implicit notion of the second best. 97  None of the responses withstand
critical analysis though proponents can no doubt offer indefinite rejoinders
to every counterpoint. What is most surprising is that proponents'
arguments necessarily rely on the supposed vacuity of tax law. In other
words, proponents assert that tax law is devoid of fundamental reason by
which to determine the proper taxation of the carried interests or indeed any
other economic activity. 98  The historical, often stated justifications for
capital gains taxation are of little help because those justifications are
suddenly without intellectual foundation and indeed are not even the subject
of loose scholarly consensus. 99 If this is true, then what is the basis of
capital gain taxation in any context? The proponents' logical conclusion
must be that the imposition of capital gain tax rates on any particular
economic activity, and not on others, is purely a matter of political will or
complete happenstance.
A similar conclusion can be made with regard to the long held belief
that horizontal equity ought to be the goal of our tax laws. 00 Horizontal
equity-basic fairness-is the ethic that is so obviously violated by the
taxation of the carried interest vis-A-vis the taxation of other yields to
services. Indeed, it is so simple a proposition that very few taxpayers
95 See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private-Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 2007, at 4.
96 See Landau, supra note 4.
97 That is, even proponents admit that taxing carried interest payments under capital gains
rates is inconsistent with normative principles. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 8. As noted
in Sections III and IV, proponents nevertheless insist on the status quo because of alleged
efficiency or complexity concerns.
98 See id. at 742-43. The most striking example of this is Professor Weisbach's assertion
that capital gain taxation is without fundamental basis and therefore any assertion that
carried interest payments do not fit the justifications for capital gain taxation are
inconsequential. See id.
99 Id. at 742 (asserting that "there is little if any conceptual clarity governing the
distinction between capital gains and ordinary income").
100 David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 43, 43-44 (2006). He describes horizontal equity as:
The principle of horizontal equity demands that similarly situated individuals face
similar tax burdens. It is universally accepted as one of the more significant
criteria of a "good tax." It is relied upon in discussions of the tax base, the tax
unit, the reporting period, and more. Violation of horizontal equity, while not
necessarily fatal, is nevertheless considered a serious flaw in any proposed tax
arrangement.
Id.
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require detailed explanation of its meaning. If nothing else, horizontal
equity means that we should determine the extent to which two taxpayers
are similarly or dissimilarly well off and then tax them accordingly.10 1
Faced with this simple truism, proponents instead argue that horizontal
equity has no theoretical basis and therefore cannot be relied upon to bring
us to the correct result. 102 The argument is, of course, a means to discount
populism as a legitimate basis of taxation. Though horizontal equity has
undeniable intuitive and populist appeal, proponents nevertheless reject it
because horizontal equity cannot be expressed in the sophisticated terms
proponents rely upon to obscure the precise inequity they seek to discount.
Most axiomatic truisms are incapable of sophistication.
It is, of course, only naYvet& to think that taxation is purely the product
of dispassionate scholarly analysis applied in antiseptic legislative halls. 1
03
Hence, the only valid objection opponents (like me) to capital gain taxation
of carried interests ought to legitimately raise is that proponents insist on
cloaking the status quo with an aura of objective correctness or fairness.
We cannot argue that the political force resulting in the status quo is an
illegitimate basis because the tax code is ultimately an expression of
political will, whatever its sophisticated merits may be. Still, it would be
preferable that the status quo be described for what it is-a concession
made to well organized and well funded political will. Political will, after
all, is the regimented expression of populism and, for the same reasons
populism cannot be discounted as illegitimate because it lacks sophistry,
neither can political will. Admitting this, though, would allow us to avoid
transparent efforts to torture the attractive logic that still animates the tax
code in the majority of circumstances even if political will is the force that
ultimately translates populism into statutes and regulations.
101 One might imagine that proponents can always find technical differences between
taxpayers, as no two people are exactly alike. Requiring instead that "exact taxpayers be
treated exactly alike" would, of course, disingenuously gut the ethic. See id. at 44 ("It is
important to emphasize that horizontal equity is concerned with individuals who are
'similarly situated,' not with those who are 'identically situated."').
102 After first asserting that horizontal equity supports the status quo because fund
managers are just as similar to those who use borrowed money to produce capital gains.
Weisbach, supra note 8, at 718. Weisbach then asserts that horizontal arguments are
"conceptually baseless." Id. at 740.
103 1 have noted elsewhere in my conclusion that the efforts to reform the taxation of
profit interests will ultimately succeed or fail in response to political rather than economic
science. Jones, supra note 10, at 881.
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